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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MASONRY EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY
COMPANY,

]

Plaintiff-Respondent,

]i

vs.

]

WILLCO ASSOCIATES,

Case No. 860324

J

Defendant-Appellant.

]

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
WILLCO ASSOCIATES
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the lower court commit reversible error in

refusing to hold, as a matter of law, that an accord and
satisfaction had been reached between plaintiff Masonry
Equipment & Supply Company ("MESCO") and defendant Willco
Associates, Inc., ("Willco")?
2.

Was the claimed accord and satisfaction between

MESCO and Willco supported by consideration?
3.

By cashing Willco's paid-in-full check, did MESCO

assent to the terms of the accord and satisfaction?
4.

Was MESCO's claim against Willco for damages

unliquidated at the time Willco tendered its check as payment
in full?
5.

Were the additional repair charges claimed by

MESCO disputed by the parties in good faith?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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6.

Did Willco surrender a legally enforceable right

in entering into the accord and satisfaction with MESCO?
7.

Was the lower court's finding that there was no

offsetting downtime suffered by Willco supported by sufficient
evidence?
8.

Did the trial court commit error in refusing to

dismiss MESCO's complaint for failure to give the required
written notice to Willco?
9.

Is MESCO entitled to prejudgment interest at 12

percent per annum?
10.

Was the court's ruling that MESCO is entitled to

judgment against Willco in the amount of $8,626.82 supported by
sufficient evidence?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law entered by the court on May 8, 1986, and
from the Judgment docketed on May 9, 1986, by the Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable J.
Dennis Frederick presiding.

The judgment against Willco is for

the principal sum of $8,626.82, together with interest, costs,
and attorneys' fees.
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Disposition of the Case Below
The action was commenced by MESCO on December 3,

1982.
5.)

(R. 2.)

Willco filed its Answer on April 4, 1983.

(R.

The case came on for trial before the Honorable J. Dennis

Frederick on March 5, 1986.
bench following the trial.

The court made its ruling from the
(Tr. 164.) The court entered its

Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law (R. 136), over Willco's
objections (R. 102.) and the Judgment was docketed on May 5,
1986.
C.

(R. 141.)
Statement of Facts.
This is a suit on a contract for damages allegedly

caused to a LC-30 Gerlinger crawler that was rented by Willco
Associates, Inc., ("Willco") from Plaintiff Masonry Equipment &
Supply Company (MMESC0,f).
Willco is a licensed contractor and does business as a
horizontal boring and tunneling contractor.

Willco rented the

machine from MESCO commencing on December 11, 1981, intending
to use the machine in connection with a contract that Willco
had with Kennecott Corporation by which Willco was to bore a
seven foot diameter tunnel underneath a railroad track and
insert a pipeline.

The terms of the rental of the machine by

Willco were negotiated between Frank Willden, Willco's
president,

and Lonnie Teaman, an employee of MESCO.

Mr.

Villden explained to Mr. Yeaman the purposes for which Willco
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needed the machine.

Mr. Yeaman represented that the Gerlinger

Crawler would serve all of Willco's needs in connection with
the Kennecott job.

(Tr. 141.)

During the time that Willco used the Gerlinger Crawler
on the Kennecott job, Willco experienced significant
difficulties and problems with the machine, which caused Willco
to lose approximately 80 hours down time, during which its
equipment and employees were idle.

(Tr. 80, 129, 141-58.) Mr.

Willden testified, that based on his experience in the heavy
equipment industry, the machine was too heavy for the type of
pad used on the tracks.

(Tr. 141-42.) As a consequence, the

pads continually broke off of the machine and had to be welded
back on.

Also, the machine had problems starting, caused by a

short in the battery.

(Tr. 143.) Further, the catalytic

converter was too small for the machine and melted.

(Tr. 56.)

MESCO made a number of service calls to the Kennecott job to
work on the machine.

Willco was not charged for these calls.

(Tr. 32, 149-50.) Willco incurred damages of $10,630 as a
result of the problems caused by the machine.

(Tr. 148-49.)

The first rental agreement (Exhibit 1) was signed by
Willco, and provided that the period of the rental would be
four months.

Willco returned the machine on March 30, 1982.

When the machine was returned, MESCO inspected it and claimed
the machine was damaged.

MESCO told Willco at that time that
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it would be charged for the additional repairs.

The final

rental agreement signed by Willco dated March 11, 1982,
(Exhibit 3) provided:

"Repairs to be made will be billed out

on separate invoice." MESCO gave to Willco Repair Order No.
1426, dated March 2, 1982, (Exhibit 9) charging Willco the sum
of $2,390.06 for repairs to the machine for track and for a
catalytic converter.
After receiving Repair Order No. 1426, Frank Willden
had at least two conversations with Matthew Lyman, an officer
of MESCO, in which Mr. Willden disputed that Willco was
responsible for the damages claimed on Repair Order No. 1426 or
for any other damages MESCO claimed had been caused to the
machine.

(Tr. 57-58, 75-76, 128-33, 153-54.) Mr. Willden

testified that in his second conversation with Matt Lyman, he
agreed that Willco would pay the $2,390 indicated on Repair
Order No. 1426 so long as MESCO agreed to accept that payment
as payment in full for all charges that MESCO claimed that
Willco owed, including charges on Repair Order 1426 and any
other charges or damage to the machine.

Id.

Matthew Lyman

testified at trial that he could not remember one way or the
r

other whether such a conversation occurred.

He did not deny

that he had had such a conversation with Mr. Willden.

99.5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(Tr. 94,

At the time Mr. Willden had the two conversations with
Matthew Lyman regarding Repair Order No. 1426, Mr. Willden told
Mr. Lyman that MESCO should reimburse him for his damages
caused because the machine had caused so many problems and had
not functioned in accordance with the representations and
warranties made by Lonnie Yeaman, MESCO's employee.

Frank

Willden and Matthew Lyman agreed that on payment by Willco of
the amount indicated on Repair Order No. 1426, Willco would
release all its claims against MESCO for down time and MESCO
would release all its claims against Willco for further damages
to the machine.

(Tr. 129-32.)

Following the second conversation with Matthew Lyman,
Willco tendered its check (Exhibit 7) to MESCO in the amount of
$2,390, dated October 4, 1982.

The check was tendered as

payment in full of Willco's entire account with MESCO, and
stated on the back:
Endorsement of this check constitutes payment in
full of your account #: 2224 Willco Assoc.
2224 was the account number assigned by MESCO to Willco.

(Tr.

93.) MESCO accepted and cashed the check.
Approximately three weeks after the check was cashed,
MESCO disassembled the machine and inspected it.

(Tr. 103,

108-09.) MESCO thereafter prepared Repair Order No. 1656
(Exhibit 4) which described damages totally in the amount of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,-may
£ -contain errors.

i

$8,626.82.
repaired.

(Tr. 108.) The machine was never actually
(Tr. 113.) Farrell Lewis, an employee of MESCO,

testified that the charges used on the Repair Order came from
the manufacturer's suggested price list.

(Tr. 103.) Exhibit 4

was admitted into evidence over Willco's objection.
106-07.)

(Tr.

Prior to Repair Order No. 1656, Willco had never been

advised about the amount of damages claimed by MESCO.
After receiving Repair Order No. 1656, Willco refused
to pay on the grounds that MESCO had cashed its check, which
Willco had tendered as payment in full of its whole account.
Willco further denied liability for any of the repairs
indicated on the Repair Order.

This suit followed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.
satisfaction.

Willco and MESCO reached an accord and
In conversations following the return of the

machine, the parties agreed that if Willco would make payment
on Repair Order No. 1426, MESCO would drop its claims for any
additional damage to the machine.

Willco, in turn, agreed to

drop its claims against MESCO for damages it incurred because
the machine did not work properly or as represented.

Willco

tendered its check for $2,390 with a statement on the back that
endorsement would constitute payment in full of Willco's entire
account.

The check was accepted and cashed.

At the time the

check was tendered, the amount of damages to the machine was
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unliquidated and disputed.

The accord and satisfaction claimed

by Willco was supported by consideration.
2.

The evidence was uncontoverted that Willco

incurred damage as a result of down time on the Kennecott job
incurred because the machine did not work properly or as
represented.

The testimony was undisputed that the value of

the down time was $10,630.00.
3.

MESCO was not entitled to maintain its action

againt Willco because it failed to give written notice to
Willco as required by the Rental Agreement.
4.

MESCO is not entitled to prejudgment interest at

the rate of 12 percent per annum.

The statutory prejudgment

interest rate is 10 percent per annum.
5.

The trial court's holding that MESCO was entitled

to judgment against Willco in the amount of $8,626.82 was
unsupported by sufficient evidence.

MESCO disassembled the

machine after it was returned by Willco in order to determine
what damage had been caused.

There was no evidence that MESCO

had done a similar type of inspection prior to Willco's taking
possession of the machine.

There was no evidence that the

damage to the machine was caused while it was in the possession
of Willco.

Further, Repair Order 1656 (Exhibit 4 ) , which sets

forth the damage amount claimed by MESCO was admitted
improperly because it was without foundation and constituted
hearsay.
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ARGUMENT
I.
MESCO AND WILLCO
REACHED AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
A.

Elements of an Accord and Satisfaction.
Willco tendered its check for $2,390 (Exhibit 7) to

MESCO as payment in full of all amounts that it may have owed
to plaintiff.

In Finding of Fact No. 8, the lower court found:

That the defendant submitted to the plaintiff a
check with restrictive endorsements claiming full
settlement and claiming an oral accord and
satisfaction, which check was cashed by plaintiff.
(R. 137.) The check was tendered, not as payment only of
Repair Order No. 1426, but as satisfaction of Willco's entire
account with MESCO.

By endorsing and cashing the check with

the condition on the back, MESCO entered into an accord and
satisfaction with Willco that discharged any further liability.
This Court stated the elements of an accord and
satisfaction in the context of a "paid in full" check in Marton
Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985).

There, as

here, the defendant had tendered a check as payment in full of
the entire contract.

The defendant conceded that the amount of

the check, $5,000, was due and owing to the plaintiff.

This

Court held that the general rule applied "that an accord and
satisfaction of a single claim is not avoided merely because
the amount paid and accepted is only that which the debtor
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conceded to be due."

Id- at 609 (emphasis added).

The Court

held that an accord and satisfaction had been reached, stating
the elements as follows:
An accord and satisfaction requires that there be
an unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute over
the amount due. . . . Payment must be tendered in
full settlement of the entire dispute and not in
satisfaction of a separate undisputed obligation
• . . . However, when a bona fide dispute arises
(the existence of which Marton does not dispute
in this appeal) and a check is tendered in full
payment of an unliquidated claim as we have here,
arising out of a "time and materials" contract,
the creditor may not disregard the condition
attached.
Id. at 609 (citations omitted).
In describing the elements of an accord and
satisfaction in Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d
1369 (Utah 1980), this Court indicated that consideration need
be given for the accord.

The Court stated:

Where the underlying claim is disputed or
uncertain ("unliquidated"), the obligor's assent
to the definite statement of performance in the
accord amounts to sufficient consideration, as it
constitutes a surrender of the right to dispute
the initial obligation.
. . . In such cases, consideration is often
found in the obligor's agreement to alter the
means or method of payment of the obligation
initially owed, or to surrender the assertion of
a legally enforceable right.
Id. at 1372 (citations omitted).

See. 15 S. Williston,

A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 1854, at 542 (3d ed.
1972) (A creditor who has received a check tendered as full
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satisfaction of a claim that is unliquidated or disputed in
good faith must accept it as such or return it); Ralph A.
Badger & Co. v. Fidelity BuildinR & Loan Ass'n, 94 Utah 97, 75
P.2d 669, 676 (1938) ("Settlement of an unliquidated or
disputed claim where the parties are apart in good faith
presents such consideration"); Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489,
39 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1935) ("Before there can be an accord and
satisfaction by acceptance of a less sum than claimed, there
must be an unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute as to the
amount thereof.")
Thus, there was consideration for the accord and
satisfaction between Willco and MESCO in the present case if
the claim being settled by payment of Willco's $2,390.00 check
was either unliquidated or disputed in good faith, or, as the
Court noted in Sugarhouse Finance, if Willco had agreed to
surrender a legally enforceable right.
B.

610 P.2d at 1372.

Payment of an undisputed portion of an unliquidated
claim constitutes consideration.
Although Willco disputed that it owed anything to

MESCO, it offered to settle for $2,390, which was the amount of
Repair Order No. 1426 (Exhibit 9 ) . In Finding of Fact No. 15,
the lower court found that there was no separate consideration
for the claimed accord and satisfaction (R. 138). In Finding
No. 10, the lower court stated further:

"The Court does not
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find that the defendant did anything more than the defendant
was obligated to do as he paid the balance due and owing on
that invoice."

(R. 137.)

These two findings are in error as a

matter of law.

The trial court apparently believed that if

Willco did in fact owe the amount paid by the check, that it
could not constitute consideration for an accord and
satisfaction.

Even if the amount of Repair order No. 1426 was

legitimately owed by Willco, that there was consideration since
the check was tendered as satisfaction of Willco's entire MESCO
account, which was unliquidated when the check was tendered.
The court should have held that consideration was sufficient
even if only part of the account was disputed.

Professor

Williston states:
Not infrequently, though a claim is unliquidated
or the subject of a bona fide and reasonable
dispute, it is conceded that at least a certain
amount is due. While it would appear that in
paying this conceded part of the claim, the
debtor was merely doing what he was previously
bound to do, the law looks upon an unliquidated
or disputed claim as a whole and does not
attempt to set a value upon it, or to define the
extent of the debtor's legal obligation.
Accordingly, such a claim is dealt with as a
chattel is dealt with, as something the adequacy
of which as consideration will not be measured.
By the weight of authority, the payment of the
amount admittedly due will support a promise to
discharge the whole claim.
1 S. Williston, supra § 129, at 528 (citations omitted;
emphasis added).
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In Marton Remodeling this Court held that the parties
had reached an accord and satisfaction where the defendant had
paid only what it conceded was due.

The Court stated the rule

that "an accord and satisfaction of a single claim is not
avoided merely because the amount paid and accepted is only
that which the debtor concedes to be due."
(emphasis added).

706 P.2d at 609

The Marton Remodeling opinion cited the

case of Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d 774 (Alaska
1983), in which the Alaska Supreme Court, faced with a similar
issue, held:
Although the record would permit an inference
supporting the ABL claim that Keystone paid only
that part of the debt which was undisputed, a
majority of the cases considering this issue hold
that a valid accord and satisfaction nevertheless
exists. . . • The authorities conclude that the
entire claim, including both the disputed and
undisputed elements, is unitary and not subject
to division so long as the whole claim is
unliquidated. . . . AVL's entire claim was
unliquidated. Keystone's obligation to pay a
part of AVL's invoice, even if conceded, did not
serve to render the conceded amount liquidated.
We are persuaded to adopt the majority rule
and hold that Keystone's conditional offer to pay
only the undisputed part of the unliquidated debt
in full satisfaction of that debt was supported
by consideration.
Id, at 778 (emphasis added; citations omitted.)

The Utah

Supreme Court relied on the above-quoted statement from the Air
Van Lines decision in Marton Remodeling, 706 P.2d at 609.
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Thus, even though the trial court believed that Willco
did in fact owe the $2,390.06, as indicated on Repair Order No.
1426, because the check was tendered as payment in full of the
entire account, which was unliquidated and disputed, the court
committed error in holding that the accord and satisfaction was
not supported by consideration.
The evidence at trial was undisputed that MESCO had
knowledge of the damage to the machine when the machine was
returned on March 30, 1982.

Willco submitted its check in

satisfaction of its entire amount.

The back of the check

recited that endorsement would constitute "payment in full on
your account #:

2224 Willco Assoc." (Exhibit 7.)

2224 was the

number assigned by MESCO to Willco's entire account.

Willco

does not dispute the lower court's Finding No. 8 that the check
was tendered as "full settlement."

MESCO accepted the check

knowing that, although it was payment of Repair Order No. 1426
(Exhibit 9 ) , it was tendered as payment in full of Willco's
entire account with MESCO, which included claims for damage to
the machine.
C.

By cashing Willco's paid-in-full check, MESCO
assented to the terms of the accord and satisfaction.
This Court's Sugarhouse Finance opinion specifies

that there must be "an assent or meeting of the minds of the
parties" in order to have an accord and satisfaction.
at 1372.
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610 P.2d

Frank Willden testified for Willco that he had two
conversations with Matthew Lyman regarding the damage claimed
by MESCO.

Mr. Lyman was an officer of MESCO at the time.

34, 81.)

(Tr.

Mr. Willden testified that he and Mr. Lyman reached

an agreement that MESCO would accept payment of Repair Order
No. 1426 (Exhibit 9) as satisfaction of Willco's entire
account, including damages that MESCO claimed Willco caused to
the machine.

Regarding those two conversations, Mr. Willden

testified:
Q
First of all, can you tell me with whom
you spoke concerning these charges?
A
I spoke with Matt Lyman. I spoke to
someone else when I wrote the check out, but I
don't remember who.
Q
How many conversations did you have
with Matt Lyman specifically about that
particular charge and whether it was owed or not?
A

Two definitely, maybe another one.

Q

When was the first one?

A
The first one would have been when I
saw this work order, probably sometime in March
or probably April, probably in April.
Q
Was it after the machine had been
returned?
A

I'm pretty sure it was.

Q
Can you tell us then what was said by
yourself and what was said by Mr. Lyman? This
was on the telephone, wasn't it?
A

Yes, it was.
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Q
You just tell us what was said between
the two of you then.
A
I told him I didn't feel we owed it,
the reason being that the catalytic converter had
melted down which was not my fault, and that the
tracks, I didn't feel the tracks had to be
replaced.
Their own mechanic had told me, just weld
plates on. So they should have been able to just
weld the plates on and repair it that way.
That's what they told me to do to make the
machine go. He told me that it was a new
machine, and nobody else had had those problems,
and that he figured that I had done the damage,
that I had damaged it.
Q
damage?

Did he say anything about what kind of

A
torn up.

He said the whole undercarriage was

Q

What did you say about that?

A

I told him I did not agree with that.

Q

Did you say why?

A
Well, yes, I told him we had been using
the machine, we used it right up until the day we
turned it in. We drove it on the truck to return
it in. It was running as well as it had ever
run, and I told him that he had no right to
charge us for something that was his fault.
Also, you know, we discussed who was going
to pay for my down time, because I had lost a lot
of time, and I needed to be on other jobs. I was
paying rental and expenses.
Q

What did you say to him about the down

A

I asked him if he would pay for it.

time?
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Q

What else did you say to him about that?

A
I told him that we had been shut down
at least 80 hours. I remember that figure,
because I had had -- I was concerned about it.
Q
Did you tell him why you had been shut
down for at least 80 hours?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

What did you say?

A
Almost every morning the machine would
not start. There was something wrong in the
wiring, somewhere that the battery would
continuously run down. They replaced the
starter, but it still would not start, and the
tracks kept falling off. Every day, just about,
we had to weld three plates back on the tracks.
Q
Was there anything else that you and he
discussed in that first conversation?
A
Well, we discussed the actual quality
of the machine. I didn't feel it was a very good
machine. I considered, which I told him -Mr. Fullmer:
I object to that, your Honor,
as to what he feels the quality was. He's the
one that rented the machine, and he's the one who
was using it.
The Court:
He's relating, as I
understand it, Mr. Fullmer, what he said in the
conversation. Overruled.
The Witness:
I told him that I actually
would consider getting another machine. When I
originally looked at this, my intention was to
keep the machine.
The Court:
Well, just a minute. Limit
your testimony to the question. That is, what
was said in the conversation, not all of your
feelings out of the conversation. What was said
in the conversation.
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Q
(By Mr. Marshall) Was there anything
else in that first conversation with Matthew
Lyman then?
A
Q
recall?

That's mostly what I recall.
When was the second conversation you

A
It was sometime later.
qhile [sic] later.
Q

It was quite a

Can you remember approximately when?

A
It would have probably been in three or
four months later, July or August.
Q

Again, was this on the telephone?

A

Yes, it was.

Q
Tell the court what was said in that
telephone conversation.
A
In that telephone conversation, he
again - - h e had called and asked for payment or
asked me to call him back, which I had returned
his call, and he wanted to know when I was going
to pay it, and I told him that I didn't feel we
owed it.
Q

This is the $2390?

A
This is the 2300. In the first
conversation, he had also said that there was a
lot of damage done on the undercarriage, and we
discussed this damage on the undercarriage.
Again, he says, it's strange that you are the
only one that's had this problem. He said, you
are -- nobody else had this problem.
I said, I can't help it. The machine is too
light, and that's why I'm not going to buy it. I
told him I would pay him $2390 and nothing else,
that would be for everything that Willco had that
we had rented from him, any damages, anything,
but on the same token, I didn't want any other
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charges come in, because even if we did damage
the machine, that we had $8,000, $9,000 worth of
down time that they should pay us. He agreed to
accept the $2390.
Q

What did he say?

A
He told me, he says, if you will pay me
the $2390, he says, we will call it even. He
says, that will be fair.

Q
Did you say anything to him about the
kind of check you were going to write to MESCO?
A
I told him that, you know, we would put
pain [sic] in full on the check.
Q

What did he say?

A
He said, that's fine. I think his
exact words is, I see no problem with that.
Q
What position did you understand Matt
Lyman to have at the time you had those
conversations?
A
I don't know how I knew it. I always
had the understanding that he was one of the
owners.
(Tr. 127-33.)

See also Tr. 57-62, 74-75, 153-54.

Mr. Willden further testified that before he sent the
check to MESCO he called and asked for Matt Lyman, who was not
there.

He then spoke with someone else and said that Willco

was sending in the check and that he was going to put the
statement on the back that endorsement would constitute payment
in full.

(Tr. 133-34.)

He sent the check in, which MESCO

endorsed and cashed.
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At trial, Mr. Lyman testified that he could not
remember one way or the other having such a conversation with
Mr. Willden regarding the charges or the settlement with
Willco.

(Tr. 94.) He also could not remember any conversation

regarding Willco's sending a paid in full check.

(Tr. 95.)

Mr. Lyman did not deny that the conversations occurred.
only testified he couldn't remember.

He

(Tr. 94, 95, 99.) He

testified that he could not even remember conversations with
Willco that he made handwritten notations about on the aging
analyses (Exhibit 10). (Tr. 96.)
The lower court made no finding about whether the
conversations between Frank Willden and Matthew Lyman
occurred.

Mr. Willden's testimony was uncontroverted and

constituted ample evidence of an agreement between Willco and
MESCO that the check would constitute payment in full. The
lower court did find that Willco tendered the check "claiming
full settlement and claiming an oral accord and satisfaction."
(R. 137.) Thus, the court plainly found that when Willco
submitted the check, it believed that an oral accord and
satisfaction had been reached with MESCO.
Even if the lower court had found that Matthew Lyman
did not assent to the accord and satisfaction on behalf of
MESCO, as a matter of law the court should have implied an
assent on the grounds that MESCO accepted and cashed Willco's
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check which was tendered as payment in full.

This rule was

summarized as follows by Professor Williston:
If the parties are dealing orally with one
another and the debtor offers the creditor a
check in full satisfaction which the creditor
takes, it must be inferred that he assents to
the terms.

So if the debtor laid down the check and
departed, saying, "If this is taken, it is full
satisfaction/1 (and similarly if the debtor
sends the check with a like notice), and the
creditor takes it, saying nothing, his taking
will be equivalent to an expression of assent to
the offer, whatever his mental intent.
If he shows by some act or word, not brought
home to the debtor at the time that he takes the
check, that his intention is not to treat the
debt as satisfied, he should still be regarded as
assenting to the terms of the debtor's offer, for
under the circumstances the debtor has reason to
suppose that the taking of the check is a
manifestation of assent.
15 S. Williston, supra § 1855, at 549, 51 (citation omitted;
emphasis added).

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 281

comment d (1981) (Acceptance by creditor of a paid in full
check, where there is consideration, may form the basis of an
enforceable accord).
Consistent with this rule, courts have thus held that
a creditor who accepts a check marked "payment in full" does so
at his own risk.

In Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607

(Utah 1985), this Court held that there was an accord and
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satisfaction where the defendant tendered a paid-in-full check
for the undisputed amount even though the creditor marked "not
full payment" on the check.

The Court stated:

It is of no legal consequence that Marton told
Jensen upon receipt of the $5,000 check that he
did not regard it as payment in full. Marton
could not disregard with immunity the condition
placed on the check by Jensen by writing "not
full payment" under the condition.
706 P.2d at 609.

See Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d

774, 778 (Alaska (1983) ("AVL had the option either to tear up
the check and sue for what it felt was due or to cash the check
and consider the contract dispute resolved.

When it cashed the

check it effectively accepted Keystone's offer to compromise
and satisfy the debt").
In the present case, MESCO accepted and cashed
Willco's check which was tendered as full settlement, according
to Finding of Fact No. 8.

(R. 137.)

That finding by itself

contains all of the elements of an accord and satisfaction, and
the lower court erred in not so finding.

The necessary assent

should be implied where MESCO accepted the check tendered as
payment in full.

Even if MESCO had written "not full payment"

or "endorsed under protest" on the check, it would still be
held to have assented, as shown by the Martin Remodeling case.
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D.

MESCO's claim against Willco was unliquidated at the
time the check was tendered as payment in full.
Although the lower court did not make any finding

regarding whether the debt sued on by MESCO was unliquidated,
the evidence was uncontroverted that it was.

Because Willco's

alleged debt to MESCO was unliquidated at the time the check
was tendered, the lower court committed error in not holding
that there was a valid accord and satisfaction supported by
consideration.
According to this Court's Marton Remodeling opinion,
"[a]n accord and satisfaction requires that there be an
unliquidated claim or bona fide dispute over the amount due."
706 P.2d at 609.

In Sugarhouse Finance, this Court used the

term "uncertain" in defining what was meant by "unliquidated."
610 P.2d at 1372.

The evidence was clear that if anything was

uncertain, it was the total cost of the repairs to the machine,
which was not calculated until after MESCO had received and
cashed Willco's check.

Farrell Lewis testified that he did not

prepare Exhibit 4 until October 28, 1982, when the machine was
disassembled.

(Tr. 102, 108-09.)

Willco's check was received

and cashed on or about October 4, 1982.

(Exhibit 7.)

Professor Williston elaborated on what constitutes an
unliquidated account, noting that M[a]n unliquidated claim is
one, the amount of which has not been fixed by agreement or
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cannot be exactly determined by the application of rules of
arithmatic or of law.M

1 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law

of Contracts § 128, at 526 (3d ed. 1957).

It has been further

stated:
A claim is "unliquidated," within the meaning of
the rule relating to partial payment, or payment
of a less amount than is claimed, as an accord
and satisfaction, where the creditor would be
compelled, but for the settlement, to bear some
further burden in order to have the amount of the
claim so fixed or established that the debtor
would be bound thereby. Thus, a claim is
unliquidated, even if it appears that something
is due . . . .
1 C.J.S. Accord and Satisfaction § 47, at 528-29 (1985)
(emphasis added).
Thus, in Sharpe v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance
Co., 62 N.C. App. 564, 302 S.E.2d 893 (1983), the court held
that a claim for insurance coverage for damages from a fire was
unliquidated where the actual cash value of the items destroyed
"could not be resolved by a predetermined mathematical formula,
and it was not agreed prior to the date of loss."
894,

Id. at

Similarly, a claim is unliquidated where the amount

"could only be established by a jury."

Georgia Ports

Authority v. Mitsubishi International Corp., 156 Ga. App. 304,
274 S.E.2d 699, 702 (1980).

An unliquidated claim "is one

which one of the parties to the contract or transaction cannot
alone render certain."

Marathon Oil Co. v. Hollis, 167 Ga.

App- 48, 305 S.E.2d 864, 868 (1983).
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Professor McCormick defined an unliquidated claim as
follows:
A claim is liquidated if the evidence
furnishes data which, if believed, makes it
possible to compute the amount with exactness,
without reliance upon opinion or discretion.
Examples are claims upon promises to pay a fixed
sum, claims for money had and received, claims
for money paid out, and claims for goods or
services to be paid for at an agreed rate.
C. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages § 54, at 213
(1935).

See Freemont National Bank and Trust Co. v.

Collateral Control Corporation, 724 F.2d 1410, 1415 (8th Cir.
1983) (A claim is liquidated if it is fixed and determined or
if it is readily determinable by computation or by reference to
a recognized standard"); Robinson v. Loyola Foundation, Inc.,
236 So. 2d 154, 157 (1970) ("A claim for debt or damages is
held to be liquidated in character if the amount thereof is
fixed, has been agreed upon, or is capable of ascertainment by
mathematical computation or operation of law");

Hallett

Construction Co. v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 258 Iowa
520, 139 N.W.2d 421, 426 (1966) ("A demand is not liquidated,
even if it appears that something is due unless it appears how
much is due"); Westamerica Securities, Inc. v. Cornelius, 214
Kan. 301, 520 P.2d 1262, 1270 (1974) ("A claim becomes
liquidated when both the amount due and the date on which it is
due are fixed and certain, or when the same becomes definitely
ascertainable by mathematical computation").
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The evidence in the present case was undisputed that
MESCO's claim against Willco for repairs to the crawler was
unliquidated at the time Willco tendered the payment in full
check.

MESCO did not send Willco the repair order for the

additional repair charges until after Willco's check had been
received and cashed-

Willco tendered the check not just as

payment of Repair Order No. 1426, but as payment in full of its
entire MESCO account, No. 2224.

At the time the check was

tendered, the claim for additional repairs was unknown and
uncertain.

Being thus unliquidated, the accord and

satisfaction was supported by consideration and must be upheld.
E.

The claim for additional repair charges was disputed
by the parties in good faith.
According to Marton Remodeling, an accord and

satisfaction will also be supported by consideration if there
is a "bona fide dispute over the amount due."
609.

706 P.2d at

Thus, consideration for the accord and satisfaction

claimed by Willco will also be found if the additional repair
charges were disputed in good faith.

It is not necessary that

the court to find that Willco's dispute with MESCO over the
charges was meritorious, so long as the dispute was made
honestly and in good faith.

The Supreme Court of Utah stated

in Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39 P.2d 1073 (1935), that
there will be consideration for an accord and satisfaction
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where there was M a bona fide dispute as to the amount thereof.
It is not necessary for the claim to be well founded, but it
must be made in good faith."

Id. at 1076 (emphasis added.)

In its decision in Marton Remodeling this Court
relied on the Alaska decision of Air Van Lines, Inc. v.
Buster, 673 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1983), citing it four times.
With respect to the issue whether there was a bona fide dispute
sufficient to support the accord and satisfaction, the Alaska
court stated:
For AVL [the creditor] to avoid summary judgment
on the issue of whether the accord was supported
by adequate consideration, it would have to
establish either bad faith or the absence of a
bona fide dispute. AVL could not establish
Keystone's [the debtor] bad faith simply by
showing that a jury might have found in its
favor on the overtime claim. In the absence of
some direct evidence of bad faith, AVL must
establish that at the time it ignored the
restrictive endorsement and cashed the check no
bona fide dispute existed as a matter of law.
Because reasonable people couple differ on the
issue of whether Keystone's conduct constituted
implied authorization to pay overtime, there was
a bona fide dispute on this issue as a matter of
law. We therefore hold that AVL negotiated the
full payment check at its peril.
Id. at 778 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
It has also been stated:
It is not material which of the parties is
right in his contention, or that either or both
are mistaken; it also makes no difference whether
the dispute arises over, or involves, a question
of fact or one of law. Furthermore, it is not
necessary that the contention of either party be
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well founded in fact or in law, or rest upon
sound reasons, or that the matter be really
doubtful, for the court will not inquire into the
merits of the dispute, so long as it is founded
on some reasonably tenable or plausible grounds.
Basically, it is sufficient if the parties
honestly believe in the correctness of their
respective positions, and assert their claims in
good faith, or consider the matter so far
doubtful as to make it the subject of a mutual
adjustment or settlement; even a full knowledge
of all the facts is not a prerequisite to the
existence of a good faith controversy.
1 C.J.S Accord and Satisfaction § 46, at 526-27 (1985)
(citations omitted emphasis added).

See 1 S. Williston,

supra, § 128, at 526 (3d ed. 1957) ("The surrender of a
disputed claim, whether unliquidated or liquidated, if the
dispute is honest and not obviously frivolous, is consideration
which the law will not attempt to evaluate.")
The testimony of Frank Willden at trial was
uncontroverted that he disputed with MESCO both liability for
and the amount of the additional repair charges contained on
Repair Order No. 1426, and for any other damage MESCO claimed.
(Tr. 57-58, 75-76, 128-33, 153-54.) MESCO's president, Del
Lewis, testified that he had had a conversation with Frank
Willden in which Mr. Willden stated

,f

he was responsible for the damages."

that he didn't feel that
(Tr. 20.) Mr. Willden

testified that Willco had had difficulties with the crawler
that resulted in approximately 80 hours of downtime.
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(Tr.

143.) He testified further that, based on his experience, the
machine was too heavy for its undercarriage and that the pads
on the tracks were too thin.
in good faith.

(Tr. 142.) Willco's dispute was

Mr. Willden testified that because of the

problems Willco had with the machine on the Kennecott job,
Willco lost approximately 80 hours.

The machine has

substantial problems with its starter (Tr. 143), with the
catalytic converter (Tr. 56), and with the tracks, which kept
falling off, (Tr. 142.).

Mr. Willden testified at some length

regarding the problems Willco had on the job, (Tr. 143-49,
161-62), which caused damages in the amount of $10,630.
148-49.)

(Tr.

The damages incurred by Willco were in breach of

specific warranties made by MESCO that the machine would be
suitable for Willco to use on the Kennecott job.

(Tr. 141.)

Mr. Willden testified that Willco would not have rented the
machine had he known how the machine would actually operate.
(Tr. 141.) MESCO'S president, Del Lewis, testified that the
was aware of the problems with the starter and with the
plates.

(Tr. 33-34.)

Frank Willden testified that MESCO made

some service calls to repair the machine on the job for which
Willco was not charged.

(Tr. 149-50.) Del Lewis also

testified that he knew of six or seven service calls made by
HESCO employees to the Kennecott job for which Willco was not
charged.

(Tr. 32-33.)
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The evidence was uncontroverted that Willco disputed
the repair charges in good faith.

That fact, by itself, was

sufficient to constitute consideration for the accord and
satisfaction.

The lower court committed reversible error in

not so holding.
F.

Willco surrendered a legally enforceable right.
According to the Sugarhouse Finance case, an accord

and satisfaction will also be supported by consideration if the
debtor has surrendered a legally enforceable right.
at 1372.

610 P.2d

The evidence in the present case was undisputed that

Willco agreed to surrender its claims against MESCO for breach
of contract and warranty if MESCO would accept the $2,390 check
as payment in full.

MESCO did not rebut Frank Willden's

testimony that the crawler did not work as had been represented
by MESCO (Tr. 141) and that Willco suffered over $10,630 in
damages as a result of the delay.

(Tr. 148-49.)

The

relinquishment of its claim for those damages by Willco also
constituted valid consideration for the accord and
satisfaction.

The trial court held that Willco "failed to

prove any offsetting down time."

(R. 138.) this finding was

contrary to the undisputed evidence concerning the difficulties
that Willco suffered because the machine didn't work.
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G.

The policy of the law favors the finding of an accord
and satisfaction.
According to the Utah Supreme Court in the Sugarhouse

Finance case, "the modern trend among the courts" is to uphold
agreements for an accord and satisfaction "wherever possible."
610 P.2d at 1372.

In its Marton Remodeling opinion the Court

observed further that "[t]he law favors compromise in order to
limit litigation.

Accord and satisfaction serves this goal."

706 P.2d at 610.

This Court should further these policies and

hold that the trial court erred in not holding that there was
an accord and satisfaction between the parties.
II.
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO
OFF-SETTING DOWN TIME SUFFERED BY WILLCO IS
NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
In Finding of Fact No. 14, the lower court found:
"That the defendant failed to prove any offsetting down time."
Accordingly, the court not only refused to hold that there was
no accord and satisfaction but that Willco was not entitled to
any set off as a result of damages Willco incurred because the
machine did not work as had been represented by MESCO.

At the

trial* Frank Willden testified regarding the problems and
difficulties that Willco experienced because the machine did
not work.

He stated that one of MESCO's employees, Lonnie

Yeaman, represented to Mr. Willden during their initial
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negotiations that the Gerlinger crawler would be well suited to
Willco's needs on the Kennecott job. Mr. Willden relied on Mr.
Yeaman's representations.

(Tr. 70, 141.) Mr. Willden

testified that had he known how the machine would actually
operate, he would never have rented it.

(Tr. 141.) He

testified that the machine was ill-suited for the kind of work
necessary on the Kennecott job.

Moreover, the battery had a

short in it, which caused continual problems to the machine
trying to start it.

MESCO's president, Del Lewis, testified

that he was aware of the problems with the battery and he was
aware that MESCO made a number of service calls to the
Kennecott job to try to fix the machine.
charged for any of these calls.

Willco was not

(Tr. 32-33.)

As a result of the difficulties experienced with the
machine, Willco experienced a significant down time on the
Kennecott job where men and equipment were idle.

(Tr.

143-49.) Mr. Willden testified that the damages suffered by
Willco as a result of the problems with the machine equaled
$10,630.00.

(Tr. 148-49.)

There was no evidence to the contrary regarding the
difficulties experienced by Willco.

MESCO's president

acknowledged that there were problems with the starter and with
the tracks.

The trial court committed error in finding that

Willco had not proved any off setting down time and in holding
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that Willco is not entitled to any off sets against the
judgment.

Because the evidence was uncontroverted, the lower

court committed error in so holding.
III.
DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO HOLD THAT
MESCO WAS NOT ENTITLED TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION
FOR FAILURE TO GIVE THE REQUIRED WRITTEN NOTICE TO WILLCO.
Each of the Rental Agreements signed by Willco
(Exhibits 1, 2, and 3) provided:
DEFAULT: An event of default under this
agreement shall be nny one of the following:
(i) a failure of Lessee to pay vlien due any rent
provided for herein; (ii) any failure of the
Lessee to perform any other obligation hereunder
and to remedy such default within tin days after
written notice thereof fr omJLess o r: (iii ) the
appointment of a Trustee for Lessee or its
properties; (iv) an assignment by Lessee for the
benefit of creditors; (v) the filing of a
voluntary petition and bankruptcy by Lessee or an
adjudication of Lessee's bankruptcy in an
involuntary proceedings; or (vi) any attempt by
Lessee to remove, sell, encumber, or sublet any
of the equipment. Upon the occurrence of an
event of default. Lessor may proceed by
appropriate legal action to enforce performance
by Lessee of the terms of this agreement and to
recover damages for breach of any term
hereof . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
According to this provision, MESCO was entitled to
commence legal action against Willco only on "the occurrence of
an event of default."

The only event of default upon which

MESCO is preceding is the failure to pay for repairs necessary
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to the equipment, which falls under subparagraph (ii) as "any
failure of the Lessee to perforin any other obligation hereunder
and to remedy such default within ten days after written notice
thereof from Lessor/' There was no evidence at trial that any
such written notice was given by MESCO to Willco. Having
failed to give the required written notice under the Rental
Agreement, MESCO was not entitled to bring legal action against
Willco.
On the same grounds, MESCO was not entitled to recover
any attorneys' fees.

The form Rental Agreement states:

"Lessee shall pay a reasonable sum to reimburse Lessor for its
costs and expenses (including attorneys' fees, unless
prohibited by law)."

Thus, if MESCO was not entitled to bring

this action, having failed to give the required notice under
the Rental Agreement, it is also not entitled to attorneys'
fees.
IV.
MESCO IS NOT ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST AT 12 PERCENT PER ANNUM.
The law of the State of Utah is that prejudgment
interest is only available on liquidated claims. As this Court
stated in Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co., 660 P.2d 229 (Utah
1983), "prejudgment interest may be awarded in the case where
the loss is fixed as of a particular time and the amount of the
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loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy."
233.

W-

at

The present case does not fall into this category.
Additionally, the lower court failed to take into

account the long delay on the part of MESCO in taking this case
to trial.
1982.

The Complaint was filed on or about December 1,

In order to prepare its case, Willco served

interrogatories and document requests (R. 37) on MESCO, which
MESCO failed to answer within the time provided by Rules 33 and
34.

Willco was required to file a Motion to Compel Discovery

(R. 49), which was granted by Judge Daniels in an Order dated
April 25, 1984 (R. 62). Thereafter, MESCO continued to delay
in prosecuting the case and, on November 14, 1985, the trial
Court, on its own motion issued an Order to Show Cause ordering
MESCO to appear and show cause why the case should not be
dismissed.

(R. 75.) MESCO did not appear at the hearing on

the Order to Show Cause, and the Court dismissed the case.

(R.

76.) MESCO subsequently moved the Court to vacate the judgment
of dismissal, which the Court granted at a hearing on December
30, 1985-

(R. 81.)
Because of the long delay on the part of MESCO in

bringing this case to trial, Willco should not be penalized by
having to pay prejudgment interest.

A similar situation arose

in the case of Nielson v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982).
There, this Court affirmed the trial court's denial of
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prejudgment interest on the grounds that the conduct of the
parties seeking interest precluded such an award.

The Court

stated that "a substantial number of the delays, in this
long-pending case were at the instance of or agreed to by the
defendants."

Id. at 1297.

Similarly, MESCO was responsible

for significant delays in the present case, which constituted a
valid ground for the Lower court to deny an award of
prejudgment interest.

The court abused its discretion by

assessing prejudgment interest at 12 percent per annum.
In addition, the lower court awarded prejudgment
interest against defendant at the rate of 12 percent per annum
"from the date of the return of the equipment."

(R. 138.)

This holding was contrary to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §
15-1-1(1), which provides that, except where the parties have
entered into a contract for a specific rate of interest, "the
legal rate of interest for the loan or forebearance of any
money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum."

The

Rental Agreement signed by Willco did not provide for the
accrual of interest at a specific rate on outstanding charges
for repairs.

Since the parties did not have a contract, the

prejudgment interest rate of 10 percent per annum must govern.
Accordingly, the lower court committed error in awarding
prejudgment interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum.
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V.
THE COURT'S RULING THAT MESCO IS ENTITLED
TO JUDGMENT AGAINST WILLCO IN THE AMOUNT OF
$8,626.82 WAS UNSUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
A.

The lower courts did not find that Willco caused any
damage to MESCO's machine.
In Finding of Fact No. 2, the lower court found:

"That the said leased Gerlinger Crawler was returned by
defendant to plaintiff on or about March 30, 1982, in a damaged
condition."
by Willco.

The court does not find that the damage was caused
Without such a finding, the court was not justified

in awarding damages for the value of the repairs against
Willco.

Even if the court were to have found that Willco

caused the damage, such a finding would not have been supported
by the evidence.

Although there was testimony adduced at the

trial that the machine was in a damaged condition when it was
returned by Willco on March 30, 1982.

When the machine was

returned, according to the testimony of Farrell Lewis, who
testified for MESCO, when the machine was returned, it was
disassembled and inspected.

He testified that it was necessary

for him to disassemble the machine in order to determine which
parts needed to be replaced.

(Tr. 103, 113.)

For example, he

testified that one of the items that he believed needed to be
replaced was a track roller, which he testified had been
subjected to excessive wear.

In order to determine the

condition of the track roller, he needed to disassemble it.
(Tr. 110-11.)
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Although there was evidence about the condition of the
machine when it was returned, there was very little evidence
about its condition before Willco rented the machine, and there
was no evidence about the condition of parts that required
disassembly to inspect.

Del Lewis was the only witness who

testified regarding the condition of the machine before Willco
took possession of it.

Although he testified that he did not

personally inspect the machine (Tr. 16), he did state that he
had seen the machine before it went to Willco and that it was
M

[b]basically a new machine."

(Tr. 18.)

Del Lewis testified that he had no knowledge of any
examination of the machine before it went to Willco.
37.)

(Tr.

MESCO introduced no evidence at trial regarding any such

examination.

The only evidence regarding the condition of the

machine was made by Mr. Lewis.

He testified that MESCO had two

crawlers and that he looked at them by walking around them.

It

is clear from his testimony that he did not perform any sort of
substantive inspection of the machine that went to Willco.
stated:
Q
Now, you indicated that you had seen
the machine prior to its going to Willco; Is that
right?
A

Yes.

Q

Do you remember the date?

A

I don't.
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He

Q

Where was it that you saw it?

A

Well, it was just out in our yard.

Q
Was this before or after you had done
the demonstrations on it?
A

It would have been after.

Q

But before it went to Willco?

A

Yes.

Q
But you don't know how much time went
by between the time you looked at it and the time
it went to Willco?
A

No.

Q
How long did you spend looking at the
machine at that time?
A
I probably walked by the machine,
looked at it, and we had two of them, one with
rippers, and one without rippers. That's really
the only reason I can remember one machine versus
the other machine. The one had rippers. The one
with rippers, we did much more demonstration
because of the rippers.
Q
The one that went to Willco was the one
without rippers?
A

That's correct.

Q
You say you walked by it.
at both machines?

Did you look

A
I don't recall whether I paid much
attention to this one versus this one. All I
know is the machines were in good repair.
Q
Ifm asking you about the basis for that
estimate. You can't remember if you actually
looked at the one that went to Willco as opposed
to the one with rippers?
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A
No. I don't think I paid any more
attention to one than the other one. I would
have walked around and looked at them, possibly
looked to see how many hours were accumulated on
the machines, do that every time a machine comes
in the yard. I would just walk around and kind
of look at them. I would look to know hours I'm
getting on my inventory.
Q
At the time that you looked at these
machines, did you turn them on?
A

No.

Q
Did you look at the undercarriage of
either of the machines?
A
I would not have climbed underneath to
look at it, no.
Q

Did you look at the rollers?

A

Not specifically.

Q

Did you look at the bearings?

A
No, I would not have gone out and
wiggled the tracks or, I mean, I didn't drive
them.
Q
Was there a muffler system on the
machine at that time?
A

Yes.

Q
Did you notice whether there were any
track plates missing?
A

Yes, and there were none.

Q
But you didn't turn the machine on, so
you donft know what the condition of the track
was that was underneath?
A
You can look at it from the side and
see if the track plates are missing.
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Q

Did you look that close?

A

Yes.

Q
You'd look at the bottom to see if
there were track plates missing?
A

Yes.

Q
You didn't make any notes or documents
that would reflect what you observed at that
time, did you?
A
All I was doing was a site [sic]
inspection.
(Tr. 41-44; emphasis added.)

Mr. Lewis further testified that there were between 75
and 90 hours that had been logged on that machine prior to its
going to Willco.

(Tr. 39.)

Matthew Lyman told Frank Willden

that the machine had been used by other customers.

(Tr.

151-52.)
Thus, there was no evidence about the state of the
machine, particularly the state of parts that required
disassembly before they could be inspected, prior to Willco's
taking the machine.

As a consequence, 6ven though MESCO

discovered damage to the machine after disassembling it, there
was no evidence that the damage was in fact caused by Willco.
Thus, the court committed error in holding that Willco was
liable for the cost of repairs.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

B.

The trial court committed error in admitting Exhibit
4 as evidence of the cost to repair the machine.
The only evidence adduced at trial regarding the value

of the damages claimed by MESCO was set forth in Repair Order
No. 1656 (Exhibit 4.)

The first and the fourth pages of Repair

Order No. 1656 were prepared by Farrell Lewis.

(Tr. 102-103.)

He testified that he obtained the prices for the parts listed
on the first page from a "suggested list price from the
Gerlinger manufacturing company."

(Tr. 103.)

No foundation

was laid for his use of those prices in calculating the value
of the damage claimed.

Counsel for Willco objected to the

admission of Exhibit 4 on the grounds that it lacked foundation
and because it violated the hearsay rule.

Objection was also

made on the grounds of lack of relevance because there was no
evidence that the particular document accurately reflected the
condition of the machine when it was returned and because there
was no evidence that there was any inspection done prior to
Willco*s taking the machine so that it could be certain that
the inspection done after its return actually reflected damage
caused by Willco.
the objection.

(Tr. 106.)

The exhibit was admitted over

(Tr. 107.)

Moreover, Del Lewis, the president of MESCO, testified
that Repair Order 1656 was prepared, not by Ferrell Lewis, but
by another MESCO employee named Randy Hamblin, who inspected
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the machine after it was returned and prepared notes itemizing
the damage.

The Repair Order 1656 was prepared from Randy

Hamblin's notes, the original of which was thrown away.
122-24.)

(Tr.

Accordingly, Repair Order 1656 constituted hearsay,

relying on other documents not admitted into evidence, namely
Randy Hamblin's notes and the manufacturers suggested list
price.

No foundation was laid allowing the admissibility of

Exhibit 1656 under any exception to the hearsay rule.
Accordingly, the trial court committed error in admitting the
exhibit over Willcofs objections.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, Willco
respectfully urges this Court to reverse the Judgment on the
grounds that there was an accord and satisfaction reached
between Willco and MESCO when MESCO accepted and cashed
Willco f s paid-in-full check.

The accord and satisfaction was

supported by consideration and is not barred even though Willco
may have paid what was legitimately owed for the repairs of the
track and the catalytic converter.

Moreover, the necessary

assent to the accord and satisfaction is implied from MESCOfs
conduct in accepting Willco's conditional check.

According to

the law as set forth in this Court's prior decisions, nothing
more is needed to show the necessary assent.
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The lower court also committed reversible error in not
dismissing MESCO*s complaint for failure to give the necessary
written notice to Willco.

The court further erred in admitting

Exhibit 4 and in holding that Willco was liable for $8,626.12,
when there was insufficient evidence regarding the condition of
the machine before it went to Willco.
ADDENDUM
Defendant-appellant Willco Associates, Inc., has
appended hereto copies of the following documents:
1.

Rental Agreement No. 0607 dated December 11,

1981, signed by MESCO and by Willco.
2.

Rental Agreement, No. 0699 dated March 11, 1982,

signed by MESCO and by Willco.
3.
documents.
4.

(Exhibit 1.)

(Exhibit 3.)

Repair Order No. 1656 and accompanying
(Exhibit 4.)
Check No. 14614 payable by Willco Associates to

MESCO in the amount of $2,390.00 dated October 4, 1982.
(Exhibit 7.)
5.

Repair Order No. 1426 dated March 2, 1982.

(Exhibit 9.)
6.

Extract from the trial transcript representing

the Court's ruling from the bench.
7.
May 8, 1986.

(Tr. 164-67.)

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed
(R. 136.)
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8.

Judgment, docketed May 9, 1986.

DATED this IS

(R. 141.)

day of November, 1986.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
John A. Snow
R. Stephen Marshall

By

jl^^Y^^^^^J^^
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
Willco Associates
50 South Main, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct
copies of the within and foregoing Brief to be hand-delivered
this

t"

day of-November, 1986, to the following:
Boyd M. Fullmer
2188 Highland Drive
Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah

84106

j^>lWyuJ^

3521m
112686
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.

RENTAL PAYMENTS: For said term or any portion thereof, Lessee shall pay to Lessor on the following schedule of Rental
Rates wt.ich do not include drayage, fuel, sjles tax, clearning, or repairs needed due to abuse.
Additional Rental
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RENTAL PAYMENTS: Rental Payments are due and payable in advance for the rental period, except when otherwise arranged
lor against spprawed credit, in which case payment will be due at end of rental period increment.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement this _fL.day of.,

A
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If Lessee i* a corporation, this Agreement is executed by authority of its Board of Directors.
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RENTAL PAYMENTS: Rental Payments are due and payable in advance for the rental period, except when otherwise arranged
for against approved credit, in which case payment will be due at end of rental period increment.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement this

day of.
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If Lessee i: a corporation, this Agreement is executed by authority of its Board of Directors.
ACCEPTED: MESCO
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295 South Redwood Road
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MASONRY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY CO., INC.
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SUBMIT

1

THEM TO THE

COURT.

2

THE

COURT:

3

MR.

MARSHALL:

4 j FILE

A BRIEF,

IF

YOU W I L L

DO T H A T .

OR I N THE ALTERNATIVE

AS THE COURT

MAYBE

LIKES.

!
5

|

THE

COURT:

I

WOULD L I K E

TO HAVE YOU GIVE

i
6

j ME THE COPIES

OF THE CASES

IF

7

MR.

MARSHALL:

HAVE A COPY FOR COUNSEL

THE

COURT:

I

YOU HAVE THEM NOW.

AS WELL.

8
9

THE

10

ALL R I G H T ,

GENTLEMEN,

STAY

IN

AREA.

11 <

COURT W I L L

BE I N

RECESS, AND THEN I

WILL

HAVE MY R U L I N G .

12

(A

13

THE

14

RECESS WAS
COURT:

I

TAKEN.)
HAVE NOW, GENTLEMEN,

REVIEWED

I

I

THE
15 I

FILE,

THE E X H I B I T S ,

AS WELL AS THE

I

16

I PROVIDED ME BY MR. MARSHALL,

AND MY JUDGMENT

FOLLOWS:

18

MONIES

19

THE

20

FURTHER THAT AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WAS REACHED,

21

AND FURTHER THAT

22

REACHED, THE

23

WHICH EXCEEDED THE CLAIMS OF THE

25

CASE, THE P L A I N T I F F

I S AS

17

24

I N THIS

AUTHORITIES

SUED FOR

CLAIMED OWING FOR REPAIRS TO RENTAL

DEFENDANT ALLEGES THE EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT.

FAILED,

AND

I F NO ACCORD A N D . S A T I S F A C T I ON WAS

DEFENDANT HAD OFFSETS FOR DOWN T I M E
PLAINTIFF.

THE DEFENDANT RENTED CONSTRUCTION
FROM THE P L A I N T I F F

EQUIPMENT

COMMENCING ON THE 11TH OF

164
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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1 ! DECEMBER OF 1 9 8 1 THROUGH THE 11TH OF MARCH OF
2

PER THE RENTAL AGREEMENTS, EXHIBITS

3

THE FORM RENTAL AGREEMENTS PROVIDE THE LESSEE WILL BE

4

:

1,

2,

1982

3 , AND 8 .

RESPONSIBLE FOR REPAIRS TO THE RENTAL EQUIPMENT.
THE LEASED EQUIPMENT WAS RETURNED ON THE

5

6

30TH OF MARCH OF 1 9 8 2 WITH CLAIMED DAMAGES AS SET

7

FORTH IN EXHIBIT *• TOTALING
EXHIBIT 3 ,

8

9 i 1982,
10

!

$8,626.82.

THE RENTAL AGREEMENT OF MARCH 1 1 ,

THE LAST RENTAL AGREEMENT HAD THE ADDITIONAL

I HANDWRITTEN NOTATION AS FOLLOWS:

j

"REPAIRS TO BE MADE

in

WILL BE BILLED OUT ON SEPARATE INVOICE," WHICH

12

DOCUMENT WAS SIGNED BY FRANK WILDEN ON BEHALF OF THE

13

DEFENDANT.
EXHIBIT 9 ,

14

INVOICE 1^26 OF MARCH 2 ,

CHARGES THE SUM OF $ 2 3 9 0 . 0 6

15
16

1982,

FOR REPAIRS TO THE

: EQUIPMENT FOR TRACK AND CATALYTIC CONVERTER.

THIS

17

INVOICE WENT UNPAID UNTIL THE *<TH OF OCTOBER OF 1 9 8 2

18

AT WHICH TIME IT WAS PAID BY CHECK WITH LIMITING OR

19 '' CONDITIONAL LANGUAGE, WHICH IS EXHIBIT 7 .

THIS SUM

20

BORE INTEREST AT THE SPECIFIED RATE, AND BY THE DATE

21

OF PAYMENT, HAD ACCUMULATED INTEREST AS EVIDENCED BY

22

!

23 ;

EXHIBIT

10.
AS COUNSEL ARE AWARE, TO ESTABLISH ACCORD

24 ; AND SATISFACTION,
25

!

?

FOUR CONDITIONS MUST BE MET.

NUMBER ONE, THERE MUST BE A PROPER SUBJECT MATTER.

s
i
j
<

165
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1 ! NUMBER TWO,

THERE MUST BE COMPETENT P A R T I E S .

2 ! THREE,

AN ASSENT

3 j NUMBER

FOUR,

4 | ACCORD.

OR MEETING OF THE MINDS

HOWEVER,

THE UNDERLYING CLAIM

5 j L I Q U I D A T E D OR S P E C I F I C
6 ! CONSIDERATION

8

j DO NOTHING HE

10

IS

THIS

P.2D

SEPARATE

THE OBLIGOR BINDS

HIMSELF

TO

NOT ALREADY OBLIGATED TO DO.

IS

SET

FORTH BY THE SUPREME COURT

I THE CASE OF SUGARHOUSE

H I 610

I N AMOUNT,

IS

OTHER THAN PAYING THE AMOUNT OWED MUST

OTHERWISE,

9

REQUIRED

CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN FOR THE

IF,

7 J BE FOUND.

IS

NUMBER

1369,

A 1980

THE

EVIDENCE

IN

FINANCE VERSUS ANDERSON,
CASE.

i

12

|

13

j HAS E S T A B L I S H E D

IN T H I S

CASE,

IN MY JUDGMENT,

BY A PREPONDERANCE THAT

THE

I

14 | EQUIPMENT

WAS DAMAGED AND THAT THE DEFENDANT

IS

i

15

! RESPONSIBLE

TO PAY S A I D SUMS.

16

! CONSIDERATION

17

REGARD TO THE

18

AM I

THERE

I S NO SEPARATE

FOR AN ACCORD AND S A T I S F A C T I O N

WITH

FINAL

NEITHER

REPAIR

BILL,

EXHIBIT

k.

PERSUADED THERE WAS A MEETING OF THE
THEREFORE,

19

I

MINDS.

F I N D THAT NO ACCORD AND

20

S A T I S F A C T I O N WAS EXTANT.

NEITHER AM I

21

THERE WAS O F F S E T T I N G

22

CONTINUED TO RENT THE MACHINE EVEN AS OF THE

23

MARCH OF 1 9 8 2 ,

24

RENTAL AGREEMENT AND ACCEPTED THE EQUIPMENT.

25

EXHIBIT

DOWN T I M E .

PERSUADED

THAT

THE DEFENDANT
2ND OF

AT WHICH TIME HE SIGNED ANOTHER

FORM
THAT'S

3.

166
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
ROCKY
MOUNTAIN
REPORTING
SERVICE,
Machine-generated
OCR, may
contain errors.
TCKt t v r u A wi/T B I Ar»r C I ' I T I : * i *

INC.

1 I

JUDGMENT,

THEREFORE,

IS AWARDED TO THE

»
i

2

! PLAINTIFF

3 J 18 P E R C E N T

FOR
PER

IN THE A M O U N T
5 j
6 I FACT,

THE

MR.

SUM OF

ANNUM
OF

$8,626.82

PLUS

AND A REASONABLE

INTEREST

ATTORNEY'S

$1875 PLUS COSTS OF THIS

FULLMER,

CONCLUSIONS

YOU PREPARE THE

OF LAW,

AT

ACTION.

FINDINGS

AND J U D G M E N T .

FEE

SUBMIT

OF
THEM

i
7 i TO MR. MARSHALL

FOR

HIS APPROVAL AS TO

FORM.

i
e

j

9

MR.
THE

FULLMER:
THANK YOU.
COURT:
COURT WILL BE

(PROCEEDINGS

10

IN

RECESS.

CONCLUDED.)

i
{

» I
i
12 ;
13 ;
14 '•

«l
I
16 !
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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BOYD M. FULLMER, #1138
Attorney for Plaintiff
2188 Highland Drive
201 Dixon Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
(801) 486-0805
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAK^' COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MASONRY EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Civil No. C82-9803
WILLCO ASSOCIATESr INC.,
Judge Frederick
Defendants.
The foregoing matter having come on regularly before the Court
for trial on the 5th day of March, 1986, with the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick, Judge presiding, and Boyd M. Fullmer appearing for the
plaintiff and R. Steven Marshall appearing for the defendant and
Frank Wilden, the president of the defendant appearing and testifying
and Del Lewis, the president of the plaintiff appearing and testifying and Farrell Lewis and Matt Lyman respectively an employee and
former employee of the plaintiff also having testified, and the
exhibits having been testified on and introduced into evidence and
the court having fully heard the evidence and being fully advised of
the facts, and defendant having objected to the Findings of Fact and
the form the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, and said objections
having been resolved before the Court under hearing date of April 28,
1986, the Court now makes and enters the following:
1.

That defendant leased a Gerlinger LC-30 Crawler from the

plaintiff for a term from December 11, 1981 to March 30, 1982.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2.

That the said leased Gerlinger Crawler was returned by

defendant to plaintiff on or about March 30, 1982, in a damaged
condition.
3.

That additional information was written on or about March 30,

1982, on the last line of a lease document.

That the billing was for

two weeks and three days and that repairs to be made would be billed
out on a separate invoice.
4.

That the reason for the filling out of repairs to be made

to be on a separate invoice was that the equipment was inspected
upon its return and determined to be in a damaged condition.
5.

That each of said lease contracts was signed by an

authorized officer of the defendant.
6.

That the standard printed terminology on each form makes

the defendant/lessee responsible for repairs to the equipment.
7.

That the defendant had the plaintiff make certain repairs

to the equipment of a value of $2,390.06 for repairs necessary
while the equipment was in use during one of the least times.
8.

That the defendant submitted to the plaintiff a check

with restrictive endorsements claiming full settlement and claiming an oral accord and satisfaction, which check was cashed by the
plaintiff.
9-

That the Court does not find an accord and satisfaction.

10*

The Court does not find that the defendant did anything

more than the defendant was obligated to do as he paid the balance
due and owing on that invoice.
11 •

That the cost to repair the equipment was $8,626.82.

12,

That in accordance with the Stipulation of the parties

a reasonable attorneyfs fee is $1,875.00, and the contract has
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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13.

That interest is awarded at the rate of 12% per annum.

14.

That the defendant failed to prove any offsetting down

15.

That there was no separate consideration for the claimed

tine.

accord and satisfaction.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant

in the sum of $8,626.82.
2.

That plaintiff is entitled to judgment for attorney's fees

against the defendant in the sum of $1,875.00.
3.

That the plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the

defendant for his costs and plaintiff shall file his separate
cost bill.
4.

That plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the

defendant for interest in the sum of 12% per annum from the date of the
return of the equipment.
5.

That the defendant is not entitled to any offsets against

said judgment,
DATED in open Court this

9f-#"~day
[f\ 9)J
9f«^day of A^ ~7fi
if/

, 1986.

„ l/M

ERICK

JUDfly J . DEW

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ATTEST
H. pJXQN HINDLEY
Ctorit

R. STEPHEN MARSHALL

Deputy Oterk

BOYD M. FULLMER
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BOYD M. FULLMER, #1138
,
Attorney for Plaintiff
201 Dixon Building
2188 Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
(801) 486-0805

A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT 'LAKE'COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

04 , *e c- At,.
MASONRY EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY,

:;

Plaintiff,

::

vs.
WILLCO ASSOCIATES, INC.,

.r-? ji

.

$f^

1-.ft• ai^

JUDGMENT

:

Civil No. C82-9803

:

Judge Frederick

Defendant.
The foregoing matter having come on regularly for trial before
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, one of the Judges of the aboveentitled Court on the 5th day of xMarch, 1986, and Boyd M. Fullmer
appearing for the plaintiff, and R. Steven Marshall appearing for
the defendant, and the witnesses having appeared and testified and
the exhibits having been admitted and testified on and the Court
having been fully advised in the facts and the law and made Findings
of Fact and Conclusions thereon, and defendant having filed his
objections and those objections having been resolved before the Court
on a hearing of April 28, 1986, and it being a proper matter, it is
hereby,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That plaintiff have judgment against the defendant in the

sum of $8,626.82.
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2.

That plaintiff have judgment against defendant for interest

in the sum of 12% per annum from the date of return of the equipment
of March 30, 1932, in the sum of $4,226.74.
3.

That plaintiff is entitled to interest on this judgment

at the rate of 12% per annum.
4.

That plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the

defendant for a reasonable attorney's fee in the sum of $1,875.00,
and for costs.
5.

That defendant is not entitled to any offsetting amounts.

DATED in open Court this
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day o f May, 1 9 8 6 .
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Dtpjty C'.erk

BOYD M. FULLMER
Attorney for Plaintiff

R. STEPHEN MARSHALL
Attorney for Defendant
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